2:09 a.m.
Hi,
On 05/05/2011 11:20 AM, Vitaly Magerya wrote:
Jon Dowland wrote:
> I'd like to hear from some other distros to see who else does what before
> considering such a move.
FWIW, the common practice on FreeBSD is to place game binaries into
/usr/local/bin, static game data into /usr/local/share/<gamename>, and
variable game data into /var/games/<gamename>. There are some
exceptions, but this is how most ports work.
Interesting if you s@/usr/local@/usr@ FreeBSD is doing the exact
same thing as Fedora.
As for /var data permissions, setgid binaries with group
"games" are
common (/var/games is owned by root:games); I don't think there's any
effort to improve security above whatever the upstream offers.
Yes, in practice the discussed attack vector does not seem something
which often gets used / security bugs get filed for (*). Still I think
it would be good to agree on a way to best harden setgid games games,
esp. for the mentioned wiki page with advises for upstreams for games.
*) Likely because there is lower hanging fruit for blackhats to abuse.
Regards,
Hans
4:56 a.m.
New subject: Standardizing various games packaging things across distros
Yes, in practice the discussed attack vector does not seem something
which often gets used / security bugs get filed for (*). Still I think
it would be good to agree on a way to best harden setgid games games,
esp. for the mentioned wiki page with advises for upstreams for games.
If you'd ask me, "open file, drop privileges" is a sensible thing to do,
and pushing such patches upstream is even better, because it will
instantly offer increase in security for all the downstream users
without any work on their part (even those who install programs manually
will benefit).
(Other security concerns, like an exploitable game being able to read
and write all your home directory is more of a pressing matter though).
1:35 p.m.
New subject: Standardizing various games packaging things across distros
On 05/06/2011 02:56 AM, Vitaly Magerya wrote:
> Yes, in practice the discussed attack vector does not seem
something
> which often gets used / security bugs get filed for (*). Still I think
> it would be good to agree on a way to best harden setgid games games,
> esp. for the mentioned wiki page with advises for upstreams for games.
If you'd ask me, "open file, drop privileges" is a sensible thing to do,
and pushing such patches upstream is even better, because it will
instantly offer increase in security for all the downstream users
without any work on their part (even those who install programs manually
will benefit).
(Other security concerns, like an exploitable game being able to read
and write all your home directory is more of a pressing matter though).
Perhaps a selinux policy could help here, at least for systems that have
selinux enabled.
--Wart
7:03 a.m.
New subject: Standardizing various games packaging things across distros
On Fri, May 06, 2011 at 09:09:07 +0200,
Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> wrote:
*) Likely because there is lower hanging fruit for blackhats to abuse.
Another issue is multiplayer games. Some games trust servers and clients
that they really shouldn't. They really need to treat them as potentially
adversary's. I know for Wesnoth (when I was spending more time on it), there
were a few of us worried about that kind of thing, but some other games
seem to be very trusting of remotely supplied data. (You more or less have
to trust it for playing the game, but you need to be sure you don't trust
the data when it comes to system integrity.)
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3 comments
4 participants
participants (4)
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Bruno Wolff III -
Hans de Goede -
Michael Thomas -
Vitaly Magerya