I agree with not checking the hash for configuration files.  There are other checks that look at the permissions for all files in an RPM package.  I think those would suffice to ensure that configuration files cannot be accessed or changed by unauthorized users. 

The other concern should be someone who does have access making unnecessary or unauthorized changes to configuration files.  I think AIDE can track those changes and rules exist to configure it to do so already.

On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 12:00 PM Watson Sato <wsato@redhat.com> wrote:


On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 5:39 PM Gabe Alford <redhatrises@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 9:09 AM Watson Sato <wsato@redhat.com> wrote:


On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 3:28 AM Shawn Wells <shawn@redhat.com> wrote:


The XCCDF currently has language stating that config files are expected to change and should not be a finding.

From following snippet I understand that a configuration file that changed is a finding and should reviewed and fixed/waived.
A "c" in the second column indicates that a file is a configuration file, which
may appropriately be expected to change.  If the file was not expected to
change, investigate the cause of the change using audit logs or other means.

Which if that is the case, changing the OVAL code so that it ignores the config files and passes doesn't make sense.
Because how will you know if you need to investigate a config file that has changed when it wasn't supposed to change?

Well, that is one of my questions.
In practice, are people expecting that configuration files which differ from default shipped in package to be reported?
Won't it just end up creating large amount of findings people don't care?

And if config files should really be checked, why skip /etc in OVAL definition?

 

If the OVAL is flagging config files, wouldn't that would be a bug in the existing OVAL code?

Yes, my suggestion is to stop checking hash of config files in rule "Verify file hashes with RPM".



--
Watson Sato
Security Technologies | Red Hat, Inc
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