Personally, I think that anything marked as %config should not be checked because they are allowed to vary anyway.

On Tue, Jan 8, 2019 at 8:52 AM Watson Sato <wsato(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > Hello, > > Regarding rule "Verify file hashes with RPM", which files resides here: > > https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/content/tree/master/linux_os/guide/sy... > > From description in rule.yml I understand that altered files should be > reported and, altered configuration files should be reported analyzed > individually. > 1. Is this the intended action? To evaluate altered configuration files? > > Looking at the OVAL check, it mostly cares about altered files under > /bin, /sbin ,/lib ,/lib64 or /usr (mainly executables and libraries > according to comment). > 2. Is this restriction only to optimize for search of libraries and > binaries? > I see a slight misalignment between check and description. This way we > won't be catching much changes in config files. > > -- > Watson Sato > Security Technologies | Red Hat, Inc > _______________________________________________ > scap-security-guide mailing list -- > scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org > To unsubscribe send an email to > scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org > Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html > List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines > List Archives: > https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe... > -- Trevor Vaughan Vice President, Onyx Point, Inc (410) 541-6699 x788 -- This account not approved for unencrypted proprietary information -- _______________________________________________ scap-security-guide mailing list -- scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org To unsubscribe send an email to scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe...

On Tue, Jan 8, 2019 at 2:57 PM Trevor Vaughan <tvaughan(a)onyxpoint.com&gt; wrote: > Personally, I think that anything marked as %config should not be checked > because they are allowed to vary anyway. > I'm leaning towards ignoring config files in OVAL check, and making it explicit in rule description. And add a note with command that would output list of config files that do not match their rpm hash, in case you would like to review altered config files manually.

On Tue, Jan 8, 2019 at 2:57 PM Trevor Vaughan <tvaughan(a)onyxpoint.com&gt; wrote: > Personally, I think that anything marked as %config should not be checked > because they are allowed to vary anyway. > I'm leaning towards ignoring config files in OVAL check, and making it explicit in rule description. And add a note with command that would output list of config files that do not match their rpm hash, in case you would like to review altered config files manually.

> On Tue, Jan 8, 2019 at 8:52 AM Watson Sato <wsato(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> Regarding rule "Verify file hashes with RPM", which files resides here: >> >> https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/content/tree/master/linux_os/guide/sy... >> >> From description in rule.yml I understand that altered files should be >> reported and, altered configuration files should be reported analyzed >> individually. >> 1. Is this the intended action? To evaluate altered configuration files? >> >> Looking at the OVAL check, it mostly cares about altered files under >> /bin, /sbin ,/lib ,/lib64 or /usr (mainly executables and libraries >> according to comment). >> 2. Is this restriction only to optimize for search of libraries and >> binaries? >> I see a slight misalignment between check and description. This way we >> won't be catching much changes in config files. >> >> -- >> Watson Sato >> Security Technologies | Red Hat, Inc >> _______________________________________________ >> scap-security-guide mailing list -- >> scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >> To unsubscribe send an email to >> scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >> Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html >> List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines >> List Archives: >> https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe... >> > > > -- > Trevor Vaughan > Vice President, Onyx Point, Inc > (410) 541-6699 x788 > > -- This account not approved for unencrypted proprietary information -- > _______________________________________________ > scap-security-guide mailing list -- > scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org > To unsubscribe send an email to > scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org > Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html > List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines > List Archives: > https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe... > -- Watson Sato Security Technologies | Red Hat, Inc _______________________________________________ scap-security-guide mailing list -- scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org To unsubscribe send an email to scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe...

On 1/8/19 1:39 PM, Gabe Alford wrote: On Tue, Jan 8, 2019 at 7:08 AM Watson Sato <wsato(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > > On Tue, Jan 8, 2019 at 2:57 PM Trevor Vaughan <tvaughan(a)onyxpoint.com&gt; > wrote: > >> Personally, I think that anything marked as %config should not be >> checked because they are allowed to vary anyway. >> > > I'm leaning towards ignoring config files in OVAL check, and making it > explicit in rule description. > And add a note with command that would output list of config files that > do not match their rpm hash, > in case you would like to review altered config files manually. > This isn't a great fix and is more of a bandaid. It would be better for us to open BZs and fix this in the troublesome RPMs spec files. The XCCDF currently has language stating that config files are expected to change and should not be a finding.

existing OVAL code?

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On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 9:09 AM Watson Sato <wsato(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > > On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 3:28 AM Shawn Wells <shawn(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > >> >> The XCCDF currently has language stating that config files are expected >> to change and should not be a finding. >> > From following snippet I understand that a configuration file that > changed is a finding and should reviewed and fixed/waived. > > A "c" in the second column indicates that a file is a configuration file, which > may appropriately be expected to change. If the file was not expected to > change, investigate the cause of the change using audit logs or other means. > > Which if that is the case, changing the OVAL code so that it ignores the config files and passes doesn't make sense. Because how will you know if you need to investigate a config file that has changed when it wasn't supposed to change?

> If the OVAL is flagging config files, wouldn't that would be a bug in the >> existing OVAL code? >> > Yes, my suggestion is to stop checking hash of config files in rule > "Verify file hashes with RPM". > > _______________________________________________ >> scap-security-guide mailing list -- >> scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >> To unsubscribe send an email to >> scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >> Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html >> List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines >> List Archives: >> https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe... >> > > > -- > Watson Sato > Security Technologies | Red Hat, Inc > _______________________________________________ > scap-security-guide mailing list -- > scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org > To unsubscribe send an email to > scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org > Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html > List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines > List Archives: > https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe... > _______________________________________________ scap-security-guide mailing list -- scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org To unsubscribe send an email to scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe...

I agree with not checking the hash for configuration files. There are other checks that look at the permissions for all files in an RPM package. I think those would suffice to ensure that configuration files cannot be accessed or changed by unauthorized users. The other concern should be someone who does have access making unnecessary or unauthorized changes to configuration files. I think AIDE can track those changes and rules exist to configure it to do so already. On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 12:00 PM Watson Sato <wsato(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > > On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 5:39 PM Gabe Alford <redhatrises(a)gmail.com&gt; wrote: > >> On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 9:09 AM Watson Sato <wsato(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 3:28 AM Shawn Wells <shawn(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> The XCCDF currently has language stating that config files are >>>> expected to change and should not be a finding. >>>> >>> From following snippet I understand that a configuration file that >>> changed is a finding and should reviewed and fixed/waived. >>> >>> A "c" in the second column indicates that a file is a configuration file, which >>> may appropriately be expected to change. If the file was not expected to >>> change, investigate the cause of the change using audit logs or other means. >>> >>> Which if that is the case, changing the OVAL code so that it ignores >> the config files and passes doesn't make sense. >> Because how will you know if you need to investigate a config file that >> has changed when it wasn't supposed to change? >> > > Well, that is one of my questions. > In practice, are people expecting that configuration files which differ > from default shipped in package to be reported? > Won't it just end up creating large amount of findings people don't care? > > And if config files should really be checked, why skip /etc in OVAL > definition? > > >> >>> If the OVAL is flagging config files, wouldn't that would be a bug in >>>> the existing OVAL code? >>>> >>> Yes, my suggestion is to stop checking hash of config files in rule >>> "Verify file hashes with RPM". >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>>> scap-security-guide mailing list -- >>>> scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >>>> To unsubscribe send an email to >>>> scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >>>> Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html >>>> List Guidelines: >>>> https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines >>>> List Archives: >>>> https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe... >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Watson Sato >>> Security Technologies | Red Hat, Inc >>> _______________________________________________ >>> scap-security-guide mailing list -- >>> scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >>> To unsubscribe send an email to >>> scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >>> Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html >>> List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines >>> List Archives: >>> https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe... >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> scap-security-guide mailing list -- >> scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >> To unsubscribe send an email to >> scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >> Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html >> List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines >> List Archives: >> https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe... >> > > > -- > Watson Sato > Security Technologies | Red Hat, Inc > _______________________________________________ > scap-security-guide mailing list -- > scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org > To unsubscribe send an email to > scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org > Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html > List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines > List Archives: > https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe... > _______________________________________________ scap-security-guide mailing list -- scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org To unsubscribe send an email to scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe...

DoD refined as requiring audit of all success/failed attempts to create/access/delete/modify files [2]

On 1/9/19 12:36 PM, Ted Brunell wrote: > I agree with not checking the hash for configuration files. There are > other checks that look at the permissions for all files in an RPM > package. I think those would suffice to ensure that configuration > files cannot be accessed or changed by unauthorized users. All of this traces back to SI-7 [0] which relates to employing "integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes" to software. To meet SI-7 we created three configuration checks [1]: (1) rpm_verify_hashes (2) rpm_verify_ownership (3) rpm_verify_permissions rpm_verify_hashes was created to align with SI-7(6), which "implements cryptographic mechanisms to detect unauthorized changes to software." The intent was to use the hash values to detect when the binaries are changed. > The other concern should be someone who does have access making > unnecessary or unauthorized changes to configuration files. I think > AIDE can track those changes and rules exist to configure it to do so > already. Alterations to configuration files are covered through the base NIAP and DoD Configuration Annex requirements. Specifically the "Audit File and Object Events" requirement, which DoD refined as requiring audit of all success/failed attempts to create/access/delete/modify files [2]. It's not that config file alterations aren't being evaluated -- it's that other rules take care of those events. No need to duplicate in rpm_verify_file_hashes. [0] https://nvd.nist.gov/800-53/Rev4/control/si-7 [1] https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/content/tree/master/linux_os/guide/sy... [2] https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/424.CANX/ _______________________________________________ scap-security-guide mailing list -- scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org To unsubscribe send an email to scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/scap-security-guide@lists.fe...

On 1/9/19 8:54 PM, Trevor Vaughan wrote: > DoD refined as requiring audit of all > success/failed attempts to create/access/delete/modify files [2] > > Ugh... this thing *destroys* systems on a regular basis along with the > chmod/chown rules. I get it but I've seen *so* many systems tanked by > those rules. Way the current Configuration Annex is written is that CNSSI 1253 and DoD systems will need to audit every file I/O.

They have a reasonably responsive team behind these. Can open a ticket through GitHub, or even submit a PR, to start the conversation to have these changed: https://github.com/commoncriteria/operatingsystem/blob/master/input/configa nnex.xml#L212#L223

On 1/10/19 12:56 PM, Steve Grubb wrote: > On Thursday, January 10, 2019 11:24:20 AM EST Shawn Wells wrote: >> On 1/9/19 8:54 PM, Trevor Vaughan wrote: >>> DoD refined as requiring audit of all >>> success/failed attempts to create/access/delete/modify files [2] >>> >>> Ugh... this thing*destroys* systems on a regular basis along with the >>> chmod/chown rules. I get it but I've seen*so* many systems tanked by >>> those rules. >> >> Way the current Configuration Annex is written is that CNSSI 1253 and >> DoD systems will need to audit every file I/O. > > It is almost the same as what is called out for by OSPP-4.2. Which you > can > see here: > > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/blob/master/rules/30-ospp-... > v42.rules Those look like a good starting point! Prior to shipping, to meet OSPP, those rules will need to also audit successful events (not just unsuccessful). Ref "Audit File and Object Events" from OSPP Config Annex: https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/424.CANX/

> AFAICS, CNSSI 1253 also wants accesses of configuration files. I would > say that is ill-advised. You may want failures due to permissions in > accessing files. But with a lot of subsystems putting configuration > in/usr/lib/ how do you tell what to monitor and what is applications? > I'd say treat config files as any other file because they are too spread > out and accessed constantly, like $HOME/.bashrc Unfortunately there's no distinguishing between config vs other file types. Currently *all* file and object events need to be audited for: File and Objects events: (1) Create (Success/Failure) (2) Access (Success/Failure) (3) Delete (Success/Failure) (4) Modify (Success/Failure) (5) Permission Modification (Success/Failure) (6) Ownership Modification (Success/Failure)

On 1/9/19 8:54 PM, Trevor Vaughan wrote: > DoD refined as requiring audit of all > success/failed attempts to create/access/delete/modify files [2] > > Ugh... this thing *destroys* systems on a regular basis along with the > chmod/chown rules. I get it but I've seen *so* many systems tanked by > those rules. Way the current Configuration Annex is written is that CNSSI 1253 and DoD systems will need to audit every file I/O.

They have a reasonably responsive team behind these. Can open a ticket through GitHub, or even submit a PR, to start the conversation to have these changed: https://github.com/commoncriteria/operatingsystem/blob/master/input/configa nnex.xml#L212#L223