sssd-devel November 2016

sssd-devel@lists.fedorahosted.org

22 participants
75 discussions

[sssd PR#50][opened] [RFC] Use GNULIB's compiler warning code
by fidencio 09 Sep '17

09 Sep '17

URL: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/pull/50 Author: fidencio Title: #50: [RFC] Use GNULIB's compiler warning code Action: opened PR body: """ This patch series was sent to the sssd-devel and some discussions already happened there[0]. I've decided to open the PR because there are some few patches that can be pushed even if we decide to not use the "many warnings" patches. Let's keep track of those patches (and discussions related to them) in the github, in this way we can avoid them to get lost. :-) [0]: https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/sssd-devel@lists.fedorahosted.… Best Regards, Changes: 683f72d (Fabiano Fidêncio, 10 weeks ago) BUILD: Make use of GNULIB's compiler warning code As GNULIB has the 'manywarnings' module, which basically turns on every GCC warning, let's make use of it. We can easily blacklist the warnings we cannot cope with, but the main goal should be to have enabled every possible GCC warning. When new GCC warnings are created the 'manywarnings' file can be refreshed from upstream GNULIB. Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <fidencio(a)redhat.com> f59828a (Fabiano Fidêncio, 5 days ago) NSS: Fix "old-style-definition" warning caught by GCC Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <fidencio(a)redhat.com> f22aff7 (Fabiano Fidêncio, 5 days ago) SIFP: Fix a "jump-misses-init" warning caught by GCC Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <fidencio(a)redhat.com> 58609d3 (Fabiano Fidêncio, 5 days ago) RESOLV: Fix a "-Werror=null-dereference" caught by GCC Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <fidencio(a)redhat.com> bd1d7fd (Fabiano Fidêncio, 5 days ago) RESOLV: Simplify reply_weight_rearrange() a little bit Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <fidencio(a)redhat.com> """ To pull the PR as Git branch: git remote add ghsssd https://github.com/SSSD/sssd git fetch ghsssd pull/50/head:pr50 git checkout pr50

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[sssd PR#32][opened] Requesting a pull to SSSD:master from fidencio:wip/#3138
by fidencio 27 Jul '17

27 Jul '17

URL: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/pull/32 Author: fidencio Title: #32: Requesting a pull to SSSD:master from fidencio:wip/#3138 Action: opened PR body: """ This patch series is intended to solve #3138 by adding a new service that updates the confdb. As part of the series this service is used by secrets service. I only ran CI locally and the two secrets tests have been failing. /o\ Also, I've noticed some weird behavior, where the sssd-update-confdb service starts for apparently no reason, when upgrading fedora packages. Anyways, these pieces of code really need some detailed review as it was the first time I've been "seriously" playing with TEvent requests. So, please, consider it more like an RFC than a well finished and polished code. Best Regards, """ To pull the PR as Git branch: git remote add ghsssd https://github.com/SSSD/sssd git fetch ghsssd pull/32/head:pr32 git checkout pr32

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Design document - SSSD KCM server
by Jakub Hrozek 10 Apr '17

10 Apr '17

Hi, I was working on a KCM server for SSSD for some time already in parallel with the files provider and had some discussions with Simo as well. Of course my intent wasn't to implement a feature secretly without a design review, but to have a prototype to base a proper design on :) However it makes sense to have a peer-reviewed design page now, also because of Fedora's move towards Kerberos and KDC proxy, which leads to questions on the Fedora lists about ccache renewals and so on -- so I think it makes sense to pitch the design to Fedora at least already.. Here is the design page: https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/wiki/DesignDocs/KCM and here is the code of the KCM responder so far: https://github.com/jhrozek/sssd/tree/kcm Time-wise, I would like to pivot to return to working on KCM now that the files provider is more or less done and tested. For your convenience, the design page text is included below as well. = KCM server for SSSD = Related ticket(s): * https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2887 External links: * [http://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Projects/KCM_client MIT wiki KCM documentation] === Problem statement === This design page describes adding a new SSSD responder, called `sssd_kcm`. This component would manage Kerberos credential caches and store them in SSSD's secrets storage. === Use cases === * A sysadmin needs to deploy applications in containers without worrying about applications clobbering each other's credential caches in a kernel keyring as keyrings are not namespaced * A user wants to keep having her Kerberos ticket automatically renewed regardless of the ticket being acquired through a PAM conversation with SSSD or from the command line with kinit * A system admin wants to leverage a collection-aware credentials cache for most of applications on their systems, yet enable a legacy application that can only work with a FILE-based ccache to interoperate with them === Overview of the solution === Over time, both libkrb5 and SSSD used different credential cache types to store Kerberos credentials - going from a simple file-based storage (`FILE:`) to a directory (`DIR:`) and most recently a kernel-keyring based cache (`KEYRING:`). Each of these caches has its own set of advantages and disadvantages. The `FILE` ccache is very widely supported, but does not support multiple primary caches. The `DIR` cache does, but creating and managing the directories including proper access control can be tricky. The `KEYRING` cache is not well suited for cases where multiple semi-isolated environments might share the same kernel. Managing credential caches' lifetime is not well solved in neither of these cache types automatically, only with the help of a daemon like SSSD. An interesting credentials cache that might solve the issues mentioned above is `KCM`. With KCM, the Kerberos caches are not stored in a "passive" store, but managed by a daemon. In this setup, the Kerberos library (typically used through an application, like for example, `kinit`) is a "KCM client" and the daemon is being referred to as a "KCM server". Having the Kerberos credential caches managed by a deamon has several advantages: * the daemon is stateful and can perform tasks like Kerberos credential cache renewals or reaping old ccaches. Some tasks, like renewals are possible already with SSSD, but only for tickets that SSSD itself acquired (typically via a login through `pam_sss.so`) and tracks. Tickets acquired otherwise, most notably though kinit wouldn't be tracked and renewed. * since the process runs in userspace, it is subject to UID namespacing, [http://www.projectatomic.io/blog/2014/09/yet-another-reason-containers-don-… unlike the kernel keyring] * unlike the kernel keyring-based cache, which is entirely dependant on UIDs of the caller and in a containerized environment is shared between all containers, the KCM server's entry point is a UNIX socket which can be bind-mounted to only some containers * the protocol between the client and the server can be extended for custom operations such as dumping a cache in a different format to a specific location. This would be beneficial for applications that only understand a certain Kerberos ccache type - for example, some legacy applications only know how to deal with a FILE-based cache, thus preventing the use of cache collections Only the Heimdal Kerberos implementation currently implements a KCM server, but both Heimdal and MIT implement the client-side operations (in libkrb5) to manage KCM-based Kerberos ccaches. This design page describes adding a KCM server to SSSD. While it's of course possible to create a completely standalone deamon that would implement a KCM server, doing so in the context of SSSD has several advantages, notably: * An easy access to the authentication provider of SSSD that already has existing and tested code to renew Kerberos credentials on user's behalf * SSSD already has a D-Bus API that could publish information about Kerberos tickets and for example emit signals that a graphical application can consume * SSSD has a 'secrets provider' to store data at rest. It makes sense to leverage this component to store Kerberos ccaches persistently === Implementation details === A new SSSD responder will be added. Since accessing the Kerberos credentials is quite an infrequent operation, the responder will be socket-activated. This responder would implement the same subset of the KCM protocol the MIT client libraries implement. Contrary to Heimdal's KCM server that just stores the credential caches in memory, the SSSD KCM server would store the ccaches in the secrets database through the sssd-secret's responder [https://jhrozek.fedorapeople.org/sssd/1.14.2/man/sssd-secrets.5.html public REST API]. For user credentials the KCM Server would use a secrets responder URI like `/kcm/users/1234/X` where 1234 is the user ID and X is the residual. The client then gets assigned a KRB5CCNAME of KCM:1234:X. Internally in the secrets responder we will store the credential caches under a new base DN `cn=kcm`. The secret responder's quota on secrets must be made modular to allow different number of secrets per base DN (so, different number of secrets and credentials pretty much). What to do in case the quota is reached is debatable - we should probably first remove service (non-TGT) tickets first for valid TGTs and if that's not possible, just fail. A failure in this case would be no different than a failure if a disk is full when trying to store a FILE-based ccache. The KCM responder would renew the user credentials by starting a tevent timer which would then contact the SSSD Data Provider for the given UID and principal, asking for the credentials to be renewed. Another tevent timer would reap and remove a ccache that reaches its lifetime. In the future, SSSD-specific operations such as writing out a FILE-based ccache might be added. The SSSD D-Bus interface would also be extended to publish information about credentials activity (such as - a ticket being acquired, a ticket was renewed etc) === Configuration changes === No KCM-specific configuration options will be added. The SSSD KCM responder would use the same common options like other SSSD services such as idle timeout. We can add a configurable KCM socket location later, if needed, but for the start it's fine to default to `/var/run/.heim_org.h5l.kcm-socket` mostly because that's what MIT defaults to as well. '''Q''': Should we add an option to explicitly enable ccache renewals and default to no renewals? I don't think this would any any security though, the attacker can just run 'kinit -R' on behalf of the user anyway. === How To Test === In order for the admin to start using the KCM service, the sssd-kcm responder's systemd service must be enabled. Then, libkrb5 must also be configured to use KCM as its default ccache type in `/etc/krb5.conf` {{{ [libdefaults] default_ccache_name = KCM }}} After that, all common operations like kinit, kdestroy or login through pam_sss should just work and store their credentials in the KCM server. The KCM server must implement access control correctly, so even trying to access other user's KCM credentials by setting KRB5CCNAME to `KCM:1234:RESIDUAL` would not work (except for root). Restarting the KCM server or rebooting the machine must persist the tickets. As far as automatic unit and integration testing is required, we need to make sure that MIT's testsuite passes with Kerberos ccache defaulting to KCM and SSSD KCM deamon running. In the SSSD upstream, we should write integration tests that run a MIT KDC under socket_wrapper to exercise the KCM server. === How To Debug === The SSSD KCM server would use the same DEBUG facility as other SSSD services. In order to debug the client side operations, setting the `KRB5_TRACE` variable might come handy. When debugging the setup, the admin might also inspect the SSSD secrets database (if permissable by SELinux policy) to see what credential caches have been stored by the SSSD. === Authors === * Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek(a)redhat.com> * Simo Sorce <simo(a)redhat.com>

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[RFC] Matching and Mapping Certificates
by Sumit Bose 07 Apr '17

07 Apr '17

Hi, I've started to write a SSSD design page about enhancing the current mapping of certificates to users and how to select/match a suitable certificate if multiple certificates are on a Smartcard. My currently thoughts and idea and be found at https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/wiki/DesignDocs/MatchingAndMappingCertificates and for your convenience below as well. Comments and suggestions are welcome. Please let me know about concerns, alternatives and missing use-cases/user-stories. bye, Sumit = Matching and Mapping Certificates = Related ticket(s): * http://www.freeipa.org/page/V4/User_Certificates#Certificate_Identity_Mappi… === Problem statement === ==== Mapping ==== Currently it is required that a certificate used for authentication is either stored in the LDAP user entry or in a matching override. This might not always be applicable and other ways are needed to relate a user with a certificate. ==== Matching ==== Even if SSSD will support multiple certificates on a Smartcard in the context of https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/3050 it might be necessary to restrict (or relax) the current certificate selection in certain environments. === Use cases === ==== Mapping ==== In some environments it might not be possible or would cause unwanted effort to add certificates to the LDAP entry of the users to allow Smartcard based authentication. Reasons might be: * Certificates/Smartcards are issued externally * LDAP schema extension is not possible or not allowed ==== Matching ==== A user might have multiple certificate on a Smartcard which are suitable for authentication. But on some host in the environment only certificates from a specific CA (while all other CAs are trusted as well) or with some special extension should be valid for login. === Overview of the solution === To match a certificate a language/syntax has to be defined which allows to reference items from the certificate and compare the values with the expected data. To map the certificates to a user the language/syntax should allow to relate certificate items with LDAP attributes so that the value(s) from the certificate item can be used in a LDAP search filter. === Implementation details === ==== Matching ==== The pkinit plugin of MIT Kerberos must find a suitable certificate from a Smartcard as well and has defined the following syntax (see the pkinit_cert_match section of the krb5.conf man page or http://web.mit.edu/Kerberos/krb5-1.14/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.html for details). The main components are * <SUBJECT>regular-expression * <ISSUER>regular-expression * <SAN>regular-expression * <EKU>extended-key-usage-list * <KU>key-usage-list and can be grouped together with a prefixed '&&' (and) or '`||`' (or) operator ('&&' is the default). If multiple rules are given they are iterated with the order in the config file as long as a rule matches exactly one certificate. '''Question: MIT Kerberos use case-sensitive matching and POSIX Extended Regular Expression syntax, shall we do the same?''' While <SUBJECT> and <ISSUER> are (imo) already quite flexible I can see some potential extensions for the other components. <EKU> and <KU> in MIT Kerberos only accept certain string values related to some allowed values in those field as defined in https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3280.txt . The selection is basically determined by what is supported on server side of the pkinit plugin of MIT Kerberos. Since we plan to extend pkinit and support local authentication without pkinit as well I would suggest to allow OID strings for those components as well (the comparison is done on the OID level nonetheless). The <SAN> component in MIT Kerberos only checks the otherName SAN component for the id-pkinit-san OID as defined in https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4556.txt or the szOID_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME OID as mentioned in https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/287547. While this is sufficient for the default pkinit user case of MIT Kerberos I would suggest to extend this component by allowing to specific an OID with <SAN:O.I.D> ==== Mapping ==== Since different certificates, e.g. issued by different CAs, might have different mapping rule, a matching rule must be added if there are more than 1 mapping rule. A single mapping rule without a matching rule might be used as default/catch-all rule in this case. If multiple rules matches the derived LDAP filter components can be grouped with the or-operator "|". A mapping rule can use a similar syntax like the matching rule where the LDAP attribute can be added with a ':', e.g. * <SUBJECT:ldapAttributeName> * <SAN:O.I.D.:ldapAttributeName> Currently I see no usage for <ISSUER>, <KU> and <EKU> in mapping rules because they do not contain any user-specific data. If at some point we will have personal CAs we might consider to add <ISSUER> based mappings. '''Question, do we need search-and-replace at all (or at this stage)? Most of the interesting values from the SAN should be directly map-able to LDAP attributes. And processing the string representation of <SUBJECT> might be tricky as discussed below. Nevertheless the following might be possible: * <SUBJECT:ldapAttributeName>/regexp/replacement/ * <SAN:O.I.D.:ldapAttributeName>/regexp/replacement/ '''where "/regexp/replacement/" stands for optional sed-like substitution rules. E.g. a rule like {{{ <SUBJECT:samAccountName>/^CN=$[^,]*$.*$/\1/ }}} '''would take the subject string 'CN=Certuser,CN=Users,DC=example,DC=com' from the certificate and generate a LDAP search filter component '(samAccountName=Certuser)' which can be included in a LDAP search filter which includes additional components like e.g. an objectClass. '''The search-and-replace does not has to be sed-like because afaik there is not library which offers this and I would like to avoid implementing it. GLib e.g. has [https://developer.gnome.org/glib/stable/glib-Perl-compatible-regular-expres… g_regex_replace]. Since we already have a GLib dependency in SSSD due to soem utf8 helper functions using might be acceptable as well. Nevertheless it would be nice to hear if there are alternative libraries available as well. ''' ===== Some notes about DNs ===== The X.500 family of standards define names as "SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName" where the sequence is "starting with the root and ending with the object being named" (see X.501 section 9.2 for details). On the other hand RFC4514 section 2.1 says "Otherwise, the output consists of the string encoding of each RelativeDistinguishedName in the RDNSequence (according to Section 2.2), starting with the last element of the sequence and moving backwards toward the first." This means that the ASN.1 encoded issuer and subject DN from the X.509 certificate can be either displayed as string in the * X.500 order: DC=com,DC=example,CN=users,CN=Certuser or in the * LDAP order: CN=Certuser,CN=Users,DC=example,DC=com As a consequence different tools will use a different order when printing the issuer and subject DN. While NSS's certutil will use the LDAP order, 'openssl x509' and gnutls's certtool will use the X.500 order (the latter might change due to https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/issues/111). This makes it important to specific the order which is used by SSSD for mapping and matching. I would prefer the LDAP order here. E.g. by default the AD CA uses the DN of the users entry in AD as subject in the issues certificate. So a matching rule like '<SUBJECT:dn>' could tell SSSD to directly search the user based on its DN (which btw is the original intention of the subject field in the certificate, only that the DN should be looked up in a more general DAP as defined by X.500 and not in the lightweight version called LDAP) Another issue is the limited set of attribute names/types required by the RFCs (see section 4.1.2.4 of RFC 3280 and section 3 of RFC 4514). If e.g. the deprecated OID [http://www.oid-info.com/get/1.2.840.113549.1.9.1 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1] is used all tools are able to identify it as an email address but OpenSSL displays it as 'emailAddress=user(a)example.com', certtool as 'EMAIL=user(a)example.com' and certutil as 'E=user(a)example.com'. So matching rules should try to avoid attribute names or only the ones from [https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4514.txt RFC 4514]: * CN commonName (2.5.4.3) * L localityName (2.5.4.7) * ST stateOrProvinceName (2.5.4.8) * O organizationName (2.5.4.10) * OU organizationalUnitName (2.5.4.11) * C countryName (2.5.4.6) * STREET streetAddress (2.5.4.9) * DC domainComponent (0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.25) * UID userId (0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1) ==== About restricting or enforcing the mapping an matching any further ==== The goal of the matching rules in MIT Kerberos is to select a single certificate from a Smartcard which will then be used for PKINIT. Since we already plan to enhance SSSD to support multiple certificates on a Smartcard and if needed prompt the user which one to use for login we should not enforce that the matching rules should return only a single certificate or nothing. Similar we plan to enhance SSSD to use the same certificate to log in with different user identities, e.g. as a user with standard privileges or as a user with administrator privileges. So it can make sense that multiple mapping rules apply to the same certificate and the related LDAP search filter components are or-ed together. In many cases the login program will first ask for a user name which will help to restrict the number of suitable certificates even further and the mapping rules are only needed to check if the certificate belongs to the user trying to log in. But gdm has a feature where gdm will detect when a Smartcard is inserted and call PAM without a user name. In this case SSSD has to determine the user name based on the certificates found on the Smartcard. If in this case multiple valid certificates are on the card and the mapping rules will return multiple users for each certificate gdm has to display a quite long selection of certificate-user pairs the user has to choose from. So it should be underlined in the documentation that the matching and mapping rules should be detailed and specific so that for the given environment they help to avoid cases where the user is prompted to select a certificate (or user name in the gdm case) when trying to log in. ==== Storing matching and mapping configuration ==== On the IPA server a new objectclass can be created to store an matching-mapping rule pair. Both attributes are optional because a missing mapping rule would mean that the user entry will be search with the whole certificate. A missing matching rule will indicate catch-all rule with a default mapping. Specifying matching-mapping rules in sssd.conf is a bit more complicated because SSSD does not respect multiple entries with the same keyword, only the last one is used. So all rules have to be added to a single line. To give it a little bit of structure the rules can be enclosed by curly-braces '{}{}' and each rule pair is separated by a comma ','. A single rule in curly braces indicates a matching rule and the mapping will be done with the whole certificate. A default/catch-all mapping rule will start with an empty pair of curly braces followed by a pair containing the mapping rule. ===== Examples ===== * '''certificate_rules = {<EKU>msScLogin}''': only allow certificates with have the Microsoft OID for Smartcard logon 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2 set. use the whole certificate to look-up the user. The same result can be achieved with * '''certificate_rules = {<EKU>1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2}''': see above * '''certificate_rules = {<ISSUER>*my-company*<SAN:rfc822Name>*(a)my-company.com$}{<SAN:rfc822Name:mail>}''': only allow certificates form the 'my-company' issuer which have an email address from the 'my-company.com' domain in the rfc882Name SAN attribute. Use the email address in a LDAP search filter '(mail=email-address)' to find the matching user. === Configuration changes === Does your feature involve changes to configuration, like new options or options changing values? Summarize them here. There's no need to go into too many details, that's what man pages are for. === How To Test === This section should explain to a person with admin-level of SSSD understanding how this change affects run time behaviour of SSSD and how can an SSSD user test this change. If the feature is internal-only, please list what areas of SSSD are affected so that testers know where to focus. === How To Debug === Explain how to debug this feature if something goes wrong. This section might include examples of additional commands the user might run (such as keytab or certificate sanity checks) or explain what message to look for. === Authors === Give credit to authors of the design in this section.

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Tlog integration and packages
by Nikolai Kondrashov 10 Mar '17

10 Mar '17

Hi everyone, I'd like to continue the discussion of tlog integration, and also present you the first release of tlog - a development preview, which has the configuration interface necessary to implement the integration: https://github.com/spbnick/tlog/releases/tag/v1 You're more than welcome to download RPMs, install, read tlog-rec(8) and tlog-rec.conf(5), and experiment! Building from the Git tree and the tarball works as well, if you're so inclined. I'm also attaching those manpages for convenience. Here are the integration plans so far, as discussed with Jakub on our devconf.cz trip meetings and before on the list. Jakub, please correct me or add details. * We follow the route similar to that taken by SELinux rule control implementation [1][2]. I.e. store the configuration in LDAP HBAC rules, write to files on the client side and then specify them to tlog upon user login. However, I'm also rather fond of the idea of specifying the whole configuration through an environment variable instead of through a file referenced by an environment variable - it's not big at all, and we'll avoid the hassle of managing the files. I implemented support for both in tlog (was easy). * We'll have to make nss_sss report user's shell as tlog-rec (how?) and specify the actual shell to tlog-rec via an environment variable, through pam_sss (with SSS_PAM_ENV_ITEM messages). I.e.: * Nss_sss would always report tlog-rec as the user's shell. * During login (e.g. through "login" or "sshd") pam_sss would add a variable to the user environment, containing, or pointing at, a tlog-rec configuration (TLOG_REC_CONF_TEXT or TLOG_REC_CONF_FILE). That configuration would contain the user's actual shell. I can also implement support for a separate variable just for the shell (TLOG_REC_SHELL?) to simplify the implementation for the start. * Tlog-rec would read the system-wide configuration and overlay it with the one specified in the environment, adding the specific user shell, and then would spawn it. Please also see the draft integration design page [3] for reference. I hope to refine and extend it in the coming weeks to match FreeIPA standards. Please chime in and suggest, object, discuss! Also, please report tlog bugs at https://github.com/spbnick/tlog/issues Thank you! Nick [1]: http://www.freeipa.org/page/SELinux_user_mapping [2]: http://www.freeipa.org/images/b/b9/Freeipa30_SELinuxUserMap.pdf [3]: http://www.freeipa.org/page/Session_Recording

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[sssd PR#70][opened] check_duplicate: check name member before using it
by fidencio 22 Feb '17

22 Feb '17

URL: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/pull/70 Author: sumit-bose Title: #70: check_duplicate: check name member before using it Action: opened PR body: """ The second patch resolves https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/3231 and adds a test for the issue. The first patches fixes a potential memory leak which so far was only relevant in the tests. """ To pull the PR as Git branch: git remote add ghsssd https://github.com/SSSD/sssd git fetch ghsssd pull/70/head:pr70 git checkout pr70

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[sssd PR#66][opened] Minor Dynamic DNS fixes
by fidencio 22 Feb '17

22 Feb '17

URL: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/pull/66 Author: justin-stephenson Title: #66: Minor Dynamic DNS fixes Action: opened PR body: """ To provide a bit more information, one of the fixes is to correct NULL being printed here(https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/3220): [nsupdate_msg_create_common] (0x0200): Creating update message for realm [(null)]. For the other(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1386748), It is not uncommon for nsupdate to successfully update DNS records but report the error below which results in return(2) to be called inside nsupdate code TSIG error with server: tsig verify failure It is easy to reproduce with AD DNS changing Dynamic DNS to 'Nonsecure and secure' on the Zone Properties. This patch allows PTR records to continue when this happens, however in this case our debug log messages still report failure and I think some improvement should be made here(not sure how exactly though) [child_sig_handler] (0x1000): Waiting for child [3710]. [nsupdate_child_handler] (0x0040): Dynamic DNS child failed with status [512] [child_sig_handler] (0x0020): child [3710] failed with status [2]. [be_nsupdate_done] (0x0040): nsupdate child execution failed [1432158238]: Dynamic DNS update failed It would be nice to correct this at the nsupdate level if this is not the expected behavior also. """ To pull the PR as Git branch: git remote add ghsssd https://github.com/SSSD/sssd git fetch ghsssd pull/66/head:pr66 git checkout pr66

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[sssd PR#85][opened] SYSDB: Removing of sysdb_try_to_find_expected_dn()
by fidencio 08 Feb '17

08 Feb '17

URL: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/pull/85 Author: celestian Title: #85: SYSDB: Removing of sysdb_try_to_find_expected_dn() Action: opened PR body: """ Currently in order to match multiple LDAP search results we use two different functions - we have sysdb_try_to_find_expected_dn() but also sdap_object_in_domain(). This patch removes sysdb_try_to_find_expected_dn() and add new sdap_search_initgr_user_in_batch() based on sdap_object_in_domain(). This function covers necessary logic. Resolves: https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/3230 """ To pull the PR as Git branch: git remote add ghsssd https://github.com/SSSD/sssd git fetch ghsssd pull/85/head:pr85 git checkout pr85

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[sssd PR#67][opened] UTIL: Unset O_NONBLOCK for ldap connection
by fidencio 25 Jan '17

25 Jan '17

URL: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/pull/67 Author: lslebodn Title: #67: UTIL: Unset O_NONBLOCK for ldap connection Action: opened PR body: """ Before the commit 75e66c388862a4ba05afe0791c5503226395bad0, the flag O_NONBLOCK was set only for the connect syscall in request sssd_async_connect_send -> sssd_async_connect_send. Such change was done for secrets provider. However, if ldap is compiled with gnutls it caused problems with start_tls and ldaps. OpenLDAP Server log: 5810cf2f connection_get(23): got connid=1042 5810cf2f connection_read(23): checking for input on id=1042 TLS: error: accept - force handshake failure: errno 11 - moznss error -12234 TLS: can't accept: TLS error -12234:SSL received an unexpected Application Data record.. 5810cf2f connection_read(23): TLS accept failure error=-1 id=1042, closing 5810cf2f connection_close: conn=1042 sd=23 sssd domain log: [simple_bind_send] (0x0100): Executing simple bind as: uid=user1,dc=example,dc=com [simple_bind_send] (0x2000): ldap simple bind sent, msgid = 2 [sdap_op_add] (0x2000): New operation 2 timeout 6 [sdap_process_result] (0x2000): Trace: sh[0x151c240], connected[1], ops[0x1515700], ldap[0x1511bd0] [sdap_process_result] (0x2000): Trace: end of ldap_result list [sdap_process_result] (0x2000): Trace: sh[0x151c240], connected[1], ops[0x1515700], ldap[0x1511bd0] [sdap_process_result] (0x0040): ldap_result error: [Can't contact LDAP server] [sdap_handle_release] (0x2000): Trace: sh[0x151c240], connected[1], ops[0x1515700], ldap[0x1511bd0], destructor_lock[0], release_memory[0] [remove_connection_callback] (0x4000): Successfully removed connection callback. [sdap_op_destructor] (0x1000): Abandoning operation 2 [dp_req_done] (0x0400): DP Request [PAM Authenticate #3]: Request handler finished [0]: Success [_dp_req_recv] (0x0400): DP Request [PAM Authenticate #3]: Receiving request data. [dp_req_destructor] (0x0400): DP Request [PAM Authenticate #3]: Request removed. [dp_req_destructor] (0x0400): Number of active DP request: 0 [dp_method_enabled] (0x0400): Target selinux is not configured [dp_pam_reply] (0x1000): DP Request [PAM Authenticate #3]: Sending result [4][LDAP] Resolves: https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/3189 """ To pull the PR as Git branch: git remote add ghsssd https://github.com/SSSD/sssd git fetch ghsssd pull/67/head:pr67 git checkout pr67

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[sssd PR#94][opened] Enable {socket,dbus}-activation for responders
by fidencio 23 Jan '17

23 Jan '17

URL: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/pull/94 Author: fidencio Title: #94: Enable {socket,dbus}-activation for responders Action: opened PR body: """ This series fixes [#2243](https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2243), [#3129](https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/3129) and [#3245](https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/3245) following what was discussed in the [ML](https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/sssd-devel@lists.fedorahos… and summed up at [this](https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/wiki/DesignDocs/SocketActivatableRespon… design document. The approach taken was the less intrusive possible and keeps the backward compatibility. [PR#84](https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/pull/84) was closed due to my lack of skills with github. :-\ """ To pull the PR as Git branch: git remote add ghsssd https://github.com/SSSD/sssd git fetch ghsssd pull/94/head:pr94 git checkout pr94

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