7:34 a.m.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1937364
Bug ID: 1937364
Summary: CVE-2021-21295 netty: possible request smuggling in
HTTP/2 due missing validation
Product: Security Response
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
Status: NEW
Component: vulnerability
Keywords: Security
Severity: medium
Priority: medium
Assignee: security-response-team(a)redhat.com
Reporter: gsuckevi(a)redhat.com
CC: aboyko(a)redhat.com, aileenc(a)redhat.com,
akoufoud(a)redhat.com, akurtako(a)redhat.com,
alazarot(a)redhat.com, almorale(a)redhat.com,
andjrobins(a)gmail.com, anstephe(a)redhat.com,
aos-bugs(a)redhat.com, asoldano(a)redhat.com,
atangrin(a)redhat.com, ataylor(a)redhat.com,
avibelli(a)redhat.com, bbaranow(a)redhat.com,
bbuckingham(a)redhat.com, bcourt(a)redhat.com,
bgeorges(a)redhat.com, bkearney(a)redhat.com,
bmaxwell(a)redhat.com, bmontgom(a)redhat.com,
brian.stansberry(a)redhat.com, btotty(a)redhat.com,
cdewolf(a)redhat.com, chazlett(a)redhat.com,
clement.escoffier(a)redhat.com, dandread(a)redhat.com,
darran.lofthouse(a)redhat.com, dbecker(a)redhat.com,
dbhole(a)redhat.com, decathorpe(a)gmail.com,
dkreling(a)redhat.com, dosoudil(a)redhat.com,
drieden(a)redhat.com, ebaron(a)redhat.com,
eclipse-sig(a)lists.fedoraproject.org,
eleandro(a)redhat.com, eparis(a)redhat.com,
etirelli(a)redhat.com, extras-orphan(a)fedoraproject.org,
fjuma(a)redhat.com, ganandan(a)redhat.com,
ggaughan(a)redhat.com, gmalinko(a)redhat.com,
gsmet(a)redhat.com, hamadhan(a)redhat.com,
hhudgeon(a)redhat.com, ibek(a)redhat.com,
iweiss(a)redhat.com, janstey(a)redhat.com,
java-sig-commits(a)lists.fedoraproject.org,
jburrell(a)redhat.com, jcantril(a)redhat.com,
jerboaa(a)gmail.com, jjohnstn(a)redhat.com,
jjoyce(a)redhat.com, jochrist(a)redhat.com,
jokerman(a)redhat.com, jpallich(a)redhat.com,
jperkins(a)redhat.com, jross(a)redhat.com,
jschluet(a)redhat.com, jstastny(a)redhat.com,
jwon(a)redhat.com, kaycoth(a)redhat.com,
krathod(a)redhat.com, kverlaen(a)redhat.com,
kwills(a)redhat.com, lef(a)fedoraproject.org,
lgao(a)redhat.com, lhh(a)redhat.com, loleary(a)redhat.com,
lpeer(a)redhat.com, lthon(a)redhat.com, lzap(a)redhat.com,
mat.booth(a)redhat.com, mburns(a)redhat.com,
mkolesni(a)redhat.com, mmccune(a)redhat.com,
mnovotny(a)redhat.com, msochure(a)redhat.com,
msvehla(a)redhat.com, mszynkie(a)redhat.com,
nmoumoul(a)redhat.com, nstielau(a)redhat.com,
nwallace(a)redhat.com, pcreech(a)redhat.com,
pdrozd(a)redhat.com, peholase(a)redhat.com,
pgallagh(a)redhat.com, pjindal(a)redhat.com,
pmackay(a)redhat.com, probinso(a)redhat.com,
rchan(a)redhat.com, rgodfrey(a)redhat.com,
rgrunber(a)redhat.com, rguimara(a)redhat.com,
rjerrido(a)redhat.com, rrajasek(a)redhat.com,
rruss(a)redhat.com, rstancel(a)redhat.com,
rsvoboda(a)redhat.com, rsynek(a)redhat.com,
sbiarozk(a)redhat.com, sclewis(a)redhat.com,
scohen(a)redhat.com, sdaley(a)redhat.com,
sd-operator-metering(a)redhat.com, sdouglas(a)redhat.com,
slinaber(a)redhat.com, smaestri(a)redhat.com,
sochotni(a)redhat.com, sokeeffe(a)redhat.com,
spinder(a)redhat.com, sponnaga(a)redhat.com,
sthorger(a)redhat.com, swoodman(a)redhat.com,
tbrisker(a)redhat.com, tflannag(a)redhat.com,
theute(a)redhat.com, tom.jenkinson(a)redhat.com,
yborgess(a)redhat.com
Target Milestone: ---
Classification: Other
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application
framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol
servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version
4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a
Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is
not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine
as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes
in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects
(`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec
`and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote
peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users
may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If
the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection,
the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can
smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1.
For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only
affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is
used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1
objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This
has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the
validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that
is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.
Reference:
https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj
Upstream patch:
https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/89c241e3b1795ff257af4ad6eadc616cb2f...
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