Anaconda 22.17+ enforces "good" passwords

Hi, First some background: Anaconda 22.17+ has started to enforce the following: +- Don't allow weak LUKS passwords either (bcl) +- Don't allow weak passwords (text mode). (sbueno+anaconda) +- Remove the press done twice to exit text (bcl) +- Don't allow weak user passwords (bcl) test@ list 1st announcement of change, and the ensuing 91 (and counting) email thread which you're welcome to skip as I'll attempt to cover the salient points in this email: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/test/2015-January/124827.html The impetus behind the change are the two scope bullets in this rejected change: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHD_PermitRootLogin_no A FESCO ticket has been opened asking for review: https://fedorahosted.org/fesco/ticket/1412 And then some points: - I think it'll make users angry. The test@ list is overwhelmingly against the change, and I expect they're more tolerant and understanding compared to the wider community. - On Windows and OS X server variants, remote access (in-bound) services are disabled by default. It's expected to use an OOB method to initially connect to a server (or even VM) and enable the desired services. - libpwquality is what's being used to "grade" the quality of the passwords used in anaconda. This has been referred to as having capricious behavior in the test@ thread. In a 2 day old build of boot.iso which contains the current version of libpwquality and anaconda 22.17, I'm finding the following: The gibberish password that an infamous xkcd comic strip railed against # pwscore Tr0ub4dor&3 67 ##anaconda=good 8 actually random lowercase latin characters. # pwscore liampres 4 # pwscore amptiato 4 # pwscore tempeadj 1 # pwscore clungerm 1 8 random characters mixed case, numbers, specials. # pwscore CHYtU$W3 27 # pwscore ja#P2etw 27 # pwscore 6*T!MsjD 21 Portions of widely published phrases, lowercase latin characters. # pwscore correcthorse 41 ##anaconda=fair # pwscore batterystaple 55 # pwscore correcthorsebatterystaple 100 # pwscore onceuponatimetherewasa 100 # pwscore itwasthebestoftimes 100 # pwscore lookbeforeyouleap 90 # pwscore dropdeadgorgeous 75 I don't have an easy way to prove this, but in a millions+ attempt brute force attack, I find it difficult to believe that correcthorsebatterystaple is not attempted, but 6*T!MsjD is attempted. I had recently read that up to 100 character dictionary only word based passwords were routinely attempted in brute force attacks. I think the change improperly shifts burden to all users without respect to their use case, in a manner inconsistent with the device control they've come to expect: no password requirements at all on mobile devices, and very minimalist ones on Windows and OS X. I don't see how being an outliar in this area, even among Linux distros, helps. Conclusion: I think the concerning services need to be disabled by default, and use OOB management to enable those services, since it's a long standing practice elsewhere. If we can do better than this, fine, but not by shifting the security burden. Thanks, -- Chris Murphy