restorecon vs. setfiles
by Gary Peck
For some reason restorecon and setfiles have different notions of what
context certain files should be. For example:
# ls -Z /usr/lib/libz.*
-rwxr-xr-x+ root root system_u:object_r:lib_t /usr/lib/libz.a
lrwxrwxrwx+ root root system_u:object_r:lib_t /usr/lib/libz.so -> libz.so.1.2.1.1
lrwxrwxrwx root root system_u:object_r:lib_t /usr/lib/libz.so.1 -> libz.so.1.2.1.1
-rwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:shlib_t /usr/lib/libz.so.1.2.1.1
# restorecon -v /usr/lib/libz.*
restorecon set context /usr/lib/libz.so->system_u:object_r:shlib_t
restorecon set context /usr/lib/libz.so.1->system_u:object_r:shlib_t
# setfiles -v /etc/security/selinux/file_contexts /usr/lib/libz.*
setfiles: read 1450 specifications
setfiles: labeling files under /usr/lib/libz.a
setfiles: hash table stats: 1 elements, 1/65536 buckets used, longest chain length 1
setfiles: labeling files under /usr/lib/libz.so
setfiles: relabeling /usr/lib/libz.so from system_u:object_r:shlib_t to system_u:object_r:lib_t
setfiles: hash table stats: 1 elements, 1/65536 buckets used, longest chain length 1
setfiles: labeling files under /usr/lib/libz.so.1
setfiles: relabeling /usr/lib/libz.so.1 from system_u:object_r:shlib_t to system_u:object_r:lib_t
setfiles: hash table stats: 1 elements, 1/65536 buckets used, longest chain length 1
setfiles: labeling files under /usr/lib/libz.so.1.2.1.1
setfiles: hash table stats: 1 elements, 1/65536 buckets used, longest chain length 1
setfiles: Done.
So, restorecon thinks that *.so files should be shlib_t, whereas
setfiles thinks they should be lib_t. Which one is right and why do they
disagree? I thought that they both get their context info from the same
place.
This is with policy-1.11.3-5 and policycoreutils-1.11-4.
gary
19 years, 11 months
Installing the new policy
by Richard Hally
Included below is the out put from doing a "yum install
selinux-policy\*" while in enforcing mode:
[root@old1 root]# yum install selinux-policy\*
Gathering header information file(s) from server(s)
Server: Fedora Core 2 - i386 - Base
Server: Fedora Core 2 - Development Tree
Server: Fedora Core 2 - i386 - Released Updates
Finding updated packages
Downloading needed headers
Resolving dependencies
Dependencies resolved
I will do the following:
[install: selinux-policy-targeted 1.13.1-1.noarch]
[install: selinux-policy-strict 1.13.1-1.noarch]
[install: selinux-policy-strict-sources 1.13.1-1.noarch]
[install: selinux-policy-targeted-sources 1.13.1-1.noarch]
Is this ok [y/N]: y
Downloading Packages
Getting selinux-policy-targeted-1.13.1-1.noarch.rpm
selinux-policy-targeted-1 100% |=========================| 25 kB 00:00
Getting selinux-policy-strict-1.13.1-1.noarch.rpm
selinux-policy-strict-1.1 100% |=========================| 1.1 MB 00:08
Getting selinux-policy-strict-sources-1.13.1-1.noarch.rpm
selinux-policy-strict-sou 100% |=========================| 1.3 MB 00:12
Getting selinux-policy-targeted-sources-1.13.1-1.noarch.rpm
selinux-policy-targeted-s 100% |=========================| 252 kB 00:01
Running test transaction:
Test transaction complete, Success!
selinux-policy-strict 100 % done 1/6
Can't open '/etc/selinux/strict/policy/policy.17': Permission denied
selinux-policy-targeted 100 % done 2/6
Can't open '/etc/selinux/targeted/policy/policy.17': Permission denied
selinux-policy-strict-sources 100 % done 3/6
make: Entering directory `/etc/selinux/strict/src/policy'
/usr/sbin/load_policy /etc/selinux/strict/policy/policy.`cat
/selinux/policyvers`
Can't open '/etc/selinux/strict/policy/policy.17': Permission denied
make: *** [tmp/load] Error 2
make: Leaving directory `/etc/selinux/strict/src/policy'
selinux-policy-targeted-sources 100 % done 4/6
make: Entering directory `/etc/selinux/targeted/src/policy'
/usr/sbin/load_policy /etc/selinux/targeted/policy/policy.`cat
/selinux/policyvers`
Can't open '/etc/selinux/targeted/policy/policy.17': Permission denied
make: *** [tmp/load] Error 2
make: Leaving directory `/etc/selinux/targeted/src/policy'
warning: /etc/security/selinux/policy.17 saved as
/etc/security/selinux/policy.17.rpmsave
warning: /etc/security/selinux/file_contexts saved as
/etc/security/selinux/file_contexts.rpmsave
Erasing: policy 5/6
warning: /etc/security/selinux/src/policy/users saved as
/etc/security/selinux/src/policy/users.rpmsave
warning:
/etc/security/selinux/src/policy/file_contexts/program/seuser.fc saved
as /etc/security/selinux/src/policy/file_contexts/program/seuser.fc.rpmsave
Erasing: policy-sources 6/6
Installed: selinux-policy-targeted 1.13.1-1.noarch
selinux-policy-strict 1.13.1-1.noarch selinux-policy-strict-sources
1.13.1-1.noarch selinux-policy-targeted-sources 1.13.1-1.noarch
Transaction(s) Complete
[root@old1 root]#
Richard Hally
20 years
Re: Installing the new policy
by Tom London
I also had some issues in the newest selinux-policy installs from the
development tree.
First, I had to remove setools to remove a yum/rpm conflict.
After successfully yum'ing selinux-policy-strict-sources (which also
installed selinux-policy-strict and removed policy and policy-sources),
I rebooted in single user mode, where I did the usual 'fixfiles
relabel'. I then rebooted to multiuser mode, where I determined that
the 'mode' was set to 'disabled' (i.e., 'getenforce->disabled').
Rooting around uncovered that there was no /etc/selinux/config
installed, nor was /etc/sysconfig/selinux updated with the
'SELINUXTYPE=strict' line. Since the thread on this was confusing to
me, I also added a line 'POLICYTYPE=strict').
I modified /etc/syconfig/selinux copied it to /etc/selinux/config and
rebooted. Still came up with selinux in 'disabled' mode.
Checking /var/log/messages showed 'SELinux disabled at boot'. So, I
rebooted adding 'selinux=1' to the boot line. This time, the boot failed
with 'can't read /etc/fstab' and brought me up in 'filesystem repair'
mode. There I determined that /etc/fstab had no security context
assigned to it (Did it get rewritten during a 'disabled' boot?)
I rebooted without the 'selinux=1' but in single-user mode, where I
adjusted the context of /etc/fstab, /etc/sysconfig/selinux and
/etc/selinux/config. I also changed /etc/sysconfig/selinux to boot up
in permissive mode.
Rebooting with 'selinux=1 single' worked, I reran 'fixfiles relabel'.
Rebooting with 'selinux=1' into permissive/multi-user worked. I changed
/etc/sysconfig/selinux and /etc/selinux/config to 'enforce'. Rebooting
single-user (i.e., with 'selinux=1 single') worked.
Rebooting strict/multi-user (i.e. with 'selinux=1') did not work. It
got jammed setting up X.org log files. Seems that
/var/log/Xorg.0.log.old had no security context so the attempt to move
/var/log/Xorg.0.log 'on top of it' failed. I'm guessing it was a
leftover from a 'disabled' boot.)
I fixed that ('chcon --reference Xorg.0.log Xorg.0.log.old'), fixed
/tmp/gconfd-tbl (same problem), and now it boots up strict/multi-user.
So here's the condensed version;
1. installing selinux-policy-strict-sources (and selinux-policy-strict)
did not setup /etc/selinux/config, nor did it modify
/etc/sysconfig/selinux. (I must admit that I was confused by the
message thread. Did I need to remove /etc/sysconfig/selinux before doing
the 'yum install selinux-policy-strict-sources'? I thought the install
would add the 'SELINUXTYPE=strict' line to an existing file, but I may
have read this wrong.)
2. My system was 'setup' to boot by default into 'disabled' mode. This
caused a lot of problems with unlabeled files, directories, etc.
Accidently forgetting to add 'selinux=1' to the boot line may cause this.
3. I had to 'yum remove setools'. Did this cause my booting or other
problems?
4. I added both 'SELINUXTYPE=' and 'POLICYTYPE=' lines to
/etc/sysconfig/selinux and to /etc/selinux/config. Are both
needed/correct? /sbin/fixfiles seems to want 'SELINUXTYPE'...
5. I manually copied /etc/selinux/conf from /etc/sysconfig/selinux. Does
that provide the correct info/format?
System is up and running in strict/enforcing mode. I will later try to
install selinux-policy-targeted*.
tom
20 years
Simplistic X11 logins not working.. (newbie questions)
by Erik Fichtner
So. I've got vanilla FC2 with SELinux loaded and the standard
policy sources loaded on my laptop. For various reasons (low memory
and a general dislike for all things GNOME; primarily), I'm trying to
make good old xdm work and start boring old twm. This requires a
little bit of manhandling within /etc/X11/xdm/Xsession and /etc/inittab.
No big deal here.
As packaged, the policy sets up xdm running as system_u:system_r:xdm_t.
This starts a copy of X which is transitioned into
system_u:system_r:xdm_xserver_t. Then there's a display ":0" sitting
around on a third pid running as system_u:system_r:xdm_t. Fine.
Logging in as my user (which results in a nice clean emf:user_r:user_t
on the console) launches a twm as system_u:system_r:xdm_t, and then
when I attempt to run an Xterm; i get the following avc denies:
avc: denied { read write } for pid=3793 exe=/usr/bin/xterm name=ptmx dev=hda2 ino=134859 scontext=system_u:system_r:xdm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:ptmx_t tclass=chr_file
avc: denied { search } for pid=3793 exe=/usr/bin/xterm dev= ino=1 scontext=system_u:system_r:xdm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:devpts_t tclass=dir
avc: denied { search } for pid=3793 exe=/usr/bin/xterm dev= ino=1 scontext=system_u:system_r:xdm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:devpts_t tclass=dir
and xterm promptly exits since it can't get a pty, and everything is
still running as system_r:xdm_t; the real issue here.
/etc/security/default_contexts does have an entry for:
system_r:xdm_t staff_r:staff_t user_r:user_t sysadm_r:sysadm_t
I even tried changing that to read:
system_r:xdm_t user_r:user_t
At this point, I started flailing around a little bit and created an
Xwm.{te|fc} pair:
type Xwm_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
domain_auto_trans(xdm_t,Xwm_exec_t,user_t)
/usr/X11R6/bin/twm system_u:object_r:Xwm_exec_t
reloaded the policy, and relabelled twm. Alles gut, ya? Nein!
Now, when xdm->Xsession fires off twm, i get this:
security_compute_sid: invalid context system_u:system_r:user_t for scontext=system_u:system_r:xdm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:Xwm_exec_t tclass=process
and twm exits. Clearly, that wasn't the answer.
So..... Questions are:
1) why doesn't default_contexts appear to have any influence upon xdm?
1a) is there a way to force it?
2) what am I supposed to do to get my window manager and its children
into user_r:user_t ?
Thanks in advance...
--
Erik Fichtner; Unix Ronin
20 years
mysql issues...
by Valdis.Kletnieks＠vt.edu
Running the mysql command as a mortal user dies:
$ mysql -hlocalhost -u MMMMMM -p MMMMMM
Enter password:
ERROR 2002: Can't connect to local MySQL server through socket '/var/lib/mysql/mysql.sock' (13)
after throwing this avc message:
May 24 21:34:19 pink kernel: audit(1085448859.069:0): avc: denied { search } for pid=4519 exe=/usr/bin/mysql name=mysql dev=dm-6 ino=129035 scontext=user_u:user_r:user_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:mysqld_db_t tclass=dir
It's not able to search /var/lib/mysql to find the socket...
A (slightly edited) grep shows us:
[/etc/security/selinux/src/policy]3 find . | xargs grep mysqld_var_run | more
./domains/program/apache.te:allow httpd_php_t mysqld_var_run_t:dir { search };
./domains/program/apache.te:allow httpd_php_t mysqld_var_run_t:sock_file { write };
./domains/program/mysqld.te:allow mysqld_t mysqld_var_run_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
./domains/program/mysqld.te:allow initrc_t mysqld_var_run_t:sock_file write;
./domains/program/mysqld.te:allow logrotate_t mysqld_var_run_t:dir search;
./domains/program/mysqld.te:allow logrotate_t mysqld_var_run_t:sock_file write;
./file_contexts/program/mysqld.fc:/var/run/mysqld(/.*)? system_u:object_r:mysqld_var_run_t
./file_contexts/file_contexts:/var/run/mysqld(/.*)? system_u:object_r:mysqld_var_run_t
Does anybody see a good reason why we don't have this too:
mysqld.te: allow mysql_cmd_t mysqld_var_run_t:dir search;
mysqld.te: allow mysql_cmd_t mysqld_var_run_t:sock_file write;
and add this to mysqld.fc:
/usr/bin/mysql system_u:object_r:mysql_cmd_t
(or the correct version thereof, it's way too late to think straight.. ;)
20 years
Permission denied when building kernel
by Matthew East
I cannot build and install a kernel with selinux enabled. Here is what
happens towards the end of the modules_install stage:
if [ -r System.map ]; then /sbin/depmod -ae -F System.map -b
/var/tmp/kernel-2.6.6-root -r 2.6.6; fi
WARNING: Couldn't open directory
/var/tmp/kernel-2.6.6-root/lib/modules/2.6.6: Permission denied
FATAL: Could not open
/var/tmp/kernel-2.6.6-root/lib/modules/2.6.6/modules.dep.temp for
writing: Permission denied
make[1]: *** [_modinst_post] Error 1
error: Bad exit status from /var/tmp/rpm-tmp.11877 (%install)
RPM build errors:
Bad exit status from /var/tmp/rpm-tmp.11877 (%install)
make: *** [rpm] Error 1
Here are the error messages:
[root@localhost linux-2.6.6]# dmesg |tail
{snip}
audit(1085609097.359:0): avc: denied { search } for pid=17414
exe=/sbin/depmod name=tmp dev=hda2 ino=196228
scontext=root:sysadm_r:depmod_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmp_t
tclass=dir
audit(1085609097.359:0): avc: denied { search } for pid=17414
exe=/sbin/depmod name=tmp dev=hda2 ino=196228
scontext=root:sysadm_r:depmod_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmp_t
tclass=dir
I hope that someone can help me with this!! Maybe I am going about the
compiling the wrong way, but it works fine with selinux disabled.
Many thanks in advance, Matt
p.s. Just for the record, or in case they are useful, here are the error
messages I get when booting my new kernel which was compiled with
selinux set to permissive.
Freeing unused kernel memory: 160k freed
security: 5 users, 7 roles, 1244 types, 1 bools
security: 30 classes, 303377 rules
SELinux: Completing initialization.
SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.
SELinux: initialized (dev , type selinuxfs), uses genfs_contexts
SELinux: initialized (dev hda2, type ext3), uses xattr
audit(1085619351.268:0): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=164
exe=/bin/bash path=/dev/null dev=hda2 ino=283937
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=chr_file
audit(1085619351.271:0): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=176
exe=/bin/bash path=/etc/hotplug dev=hda2 ino=49185
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir
audit(1085619351.271:0): avc: denied { read } for pid=164
exe=/bin/bash path=pipe:[842] dev= ino=842
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=fifo_file
audit(1085619351.272:0): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=165
exe=/bin/bash path=/dev/null dev=hda2 ino=283937
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=chr_file
audit(1085619351.274:0): avc: denied { search } for pid=177
exe=/bin/bash name=hotplug dev=hda2 ino=49185
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir
audit(1085619351.274:0): avc: denied { read } for pid=165
exe=/bin/bash path=pipe:[843] dev= ino=843
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=fifo_file
audit(1085619351.274:0): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=167
exe=/bin/bash path=/dev/null dev=hda2 ino=283937
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=chr_file
audit(1085619351.277:0): avc: denied { search } for pid=178
exe=/bin/bash name=hotplug dev=hda2 ino=49185
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir
audit(1085619351.277:0): avc: denied { read } for pid=167
exe=/bin/bash path=pipe:[844] dev= ino=844
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=fifo_file
audit(1085619351.277:0): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=166
exe=/bin/bash path=/dev/null dev=hda2 ino=283937
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=chr_file
audit(1085619351.280:0): avc: denied { search } for pid=179
exe=/bin/bash name=hotplug dev=hda2 ino=49185
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir
audit(1085619351.280:0): avc: denied { read } for pid=166
exe=/bin/bash path=pipe:[845] dev= ino=845
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=fifo_file
audit(1085619351.290:0): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=177
exe=/bin/env path=/etc/ld.so.cache dev=hda2 ino=50220
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=file
audit(1085619351.290:0): avc: denied { read } for pid=177
exe=/bin/env name=libc-2.3.3.so dev=hda2 ino=131669
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=file
audit(1085619351.290:0): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=177
exe=/bin/env path=/lib/tls dev=hda2 ino=130821
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir
audit(1085619351.290:0): avc: denied { read } for pid=176
exe=/bin/bash path=/lib/ld-2.3.3.so dev=hda2 ino=130827
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=file
audit(1085619351.290:0): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=176
exe=/bin/bash path=/dev/null dev=hda2 ino=283937
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=chr_file
audit(1085619351.291:0): avc: denied { write } for pid=176
exe=/bin/bash path=/dev/null dev=hda2 ino=283937
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=chr_file
audit(1085619351.292:0): avc: denied { search } for pid=164
exe=/bin/bash name=hotplug dev=hda2 ino=49185
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir
audit(1085619351.292:0): avc: denied { read } for pid=179
exe=/bin/bash path=/lib/ld-2.3.3.so dev=hda2 ino=130827
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=file
audit(1085619351.293:0): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=179
exe=/bin/bash path=/dev/null dev=hda2 ino=283937
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=chr_file
audit(1085619351.293:0): avc: denied { write } for pid=179
exe=/bin/bash path=/dev/null dev=hda2 ino=283937
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=chr_file
audit(1085619351.294:0): avc: denied { search } for pid=166
exe=/bin/bash name=hotplug dev=hda2 ino=49185
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir
audit(1085619351.294:0): avc: denied { read } for pid=178
exe=/bin/bash path=/lib/ld-2.3.3.so dev=hda2 ino=130827
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=file
audit(1085619351.294:0): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=178
exe=/bin/bash path=/dev/null dev=hda2 ino=283937
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=chr_file
audit(1085619351.295:0): avc: denied { write } for pid=178
exe=/bin/bash path=/dev/null dev=hda2 ino=283937
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=chr_file
audit(1085619351.296:0): avc: denied { search } for pid=167
exe=/bin/bash name=hotplug dev=hda2 ino=49185
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=dir
audit(1085619351.699:0): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=177
exe=/bin/env path=pipe:[843] dev= ino=843
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=fifo_file
audit(1085619351.700:0): avc: denied { write } for pid=177
exe=/bin/env path=pipe:[843] dev= ino=843
scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t tclass=fifo_file
SELinux: initialized (dev ram0, type ext2), uses xattr
SELinux: initialized (dev , type mqueue), not configured for labeling
SELinux: initialized (dev , type hugetlbfs), not configured for labeling
SELinux: initialized (dev , type devpts), uses transition SIDs
SELinux: initialized (dev , type eventpollfs), uses genfs_contexts
SELinux: initialized (dev , type pipefs), uses task SIDs
SELinux: initialized (dev , type tmpfs), uses transition SIDs
SELinux: initialized (dev , type futexfs), uses genfs_contexts
SELinux: initialized (dev , type sockfs), uses task SIDs
SELinux: initialized (dev , type proc), uses genfs_contexts
SELinux: initialized (dev , type bdev), uses genfs_contexts
SELinux: initialized (dev , type rootfs), uses genfs_contexts
SELinux: initialized (dev , type sysfs), uses genfs_contexts
20 years
Script to check security?
by Bob Gustafson
With all of the possible variations in security settings - strict,
permissive, local, lots of users, only daemons, etc.
Is there a script around somewhere - something like 'configure' which is
used at the beginning of a component build - which will query various
pieces of a system, do a 'setenforce 1' and then try various programs and
grep the output to give some binary answer, then do 'setenforce 0' and try
the same program, etc.
This script would help to give struggling sysadmins some degree of
confidence that what is being done to their 'policy.local' or whatever, is
benign.
Of course the script could be corrupted or buggy - one more thing to add to
when adding or changing the SELinux system, but there would be advantages:
Just as the 'no child left behind' program uses testing to measure the
effectiveness of public expenditures on schools ( :-) ), a security testing
script could help to test the effectiveness of the SELinux system as it
evolves.
A testing script would also help to rein in the tendency to add wrinkles
and grow the complexity of the system - each wrinkle would have a test
module to check it.
BobG
20 years
Re: Finding unlabeled files?
by Tom London
Thanks.
However, I'm having a slightly different problem: because of various
circumstances, some files that should be labeled appear to be unlabeled.
I'm thinking that I missed the easy way: just running 'fixfiles check'
or 'setfiles -n -v ...'
tom
----------------------------------------------------------------
* From: Thomas Bleher <bleher informatik uni-muenchen de>
* Tom London <selinux comcast net> [2004-05-30 20:12]:
> I understand its 'safer' to run 'fixfiles relabel', but some vestigial
> unlabeled files seem to remain...
Look into your policy for file contexts which specify "<<none>>" as
context. This means that setfiles does not touch these files at all, as
they can not be properly labeled by looking at the file name; so it is
best to leave them alone.
If you come from a non-SELinux system you should probably delete all
these files[0] and reboot.
Thomas
[0] the policy I'm looking right now has <<none>> only for files which
can be safely deleted if the system is in single user mode and is
restarted immediately afterwards.
20 years
Finding unlabeled files?
by Tom London
I used the following to find files that are not labeled:
find / -context 'null' -print 2>&1 | grep 'No data available'
This prints out error messages of the form:
getfilecon(/var/spool/cron/mailman): No data available
getfilecon(/var/spool/at/.SEQ): No data available
getfilecon(/initrd): No data available
getfilecon(/initrd/sys): No data available
getfilecon(/initrd/sbin): No data available
getfilecon(/initrd/linuxrc): No data available
etc.
Is there a better/proper way of doing this? (If not, perhaps I'll write
one...)
The situation comes up when converting a system to SELinux, or if you
accidently boot up an SELinux system in 'disabled' mode.
I understand its 'safer' to run 'fixfiles relabel', but some vestigial
unlabeled files seem to remain...
Thanks,
tom
20 years
selinux and RHEL
by Gene Czarcinski
This may be a bit early but ... are there plans to incorporate selinux into
Red Hat Enterprise Linux? If there is, is the target for RHEL 4 or later?
Gene
20 years
