On Fri, 2010-11-12 at 20:03 +0100, Till Maas wrote:
On Mon, Nov 01, 2010 at 10:09:17AM -0700, Adam Williamson wrote:
> I disagree. The evidence you cite does not support this conclusion. We
> implemented the policies for three releases. There are significant
> problems with one release. This does not justify the conclusion that the
> policies should be entirely repealed.
It was brought to my attention that also current Fedora releases have
problems with delaying important security updates. A fix for a remote
code execution vulnerability in proftpd was only pushed to stable with a
seven day delay:
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/updates/proftpd-1.3.3c-1.fc13
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/updates/proftpd-1.3.3c-1.fc14
And it is not a theoretical threat, I know that servers in the nearby
area have been exploited because of this vulnerability. Delaying such
updates seems to be a very bad idea. Even in the unlikely case that the
update was broken and made proftpd not start anymore, this is usually
not as bad as having the system corrupted by an evil attacker.
Thanks for flagging this up.
I'm wondering if perhaps we should devise a system - maybe a sub-group
of proventesters - to ensure timely testing of security updates. wdyt?
--
Adam Williamson
Fedora QA Community Monkey
IRC: adamw | Fedora Talk: adamwill AT fedoraproject DOT org
http://www.happyassassin.net